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RATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO
AIRLINE SAFETY IN THE FACE OF
TERRORIST THREATS
INTRODUCTION
"They are all targets. . . . every day . . . they will receive a new
corpse ......
-Osama bin Laden, multimillionaire terrorist,
issuing a threat to Americans.'
The modern threat of terrorism,2 coupled with recent attacks on
United States embassies, has led to levels of federal intrusion into the
airline industry not seen since before airline deregulation.3 In re-
sponse to the explosion of TWA Flight 800 in 1996, President Bill
Clinton summoned a commission under the leadership of Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore4 to assess the current problems with safety at United
States airports and on United States aircraft, and to recommend solu-
tions to these problems. This Comment will demonstrate that the pol-
icy approach of the Gore Commission was fundamentally flawed and
that the solutions recommended were both inadequate to provide real
safety, and threaten Fourth Amendment privacy rights, Fifth Amend-
1. Hous. CHRON., Nov. 8, 1998, at 4 (quoting bin Laden interview with ABC News, May
1998). Bin Laden also said that "[wie do not differentiate between those dressed in military
uniforms and civilians." Id. The continuing seriousness of this terrorist threat is empha-
sized by the United States State Department's pre-millenium warnings advising Americans
to avoid large groups-especially overseas. Public Announcement (visited Dec. 21, 1999)
<http://travel.state.gov/wwwterrorist.html>. The United States Customs Service placed "an ex-
tra 300 guards on duty" and altered their border posts following two arrests of Algerians who
allegedly attempted to smuggle explosives into the United States through Canada. John Don-
nelly, U.S. Scrambles to Unravel Terrorist Threat, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 1999, at Al, available
at 1999 WL 30401514.
2. Forty percent of worldwide terrorist incidents were directed toward Americans in 1992. See
John Rogers, Bombs, Borders, and Boarding: Combatting International Terrorism at United
States Airports and the Fourth Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 501, 502 (1997).
3. While the aviation industry has been deregulated for more than 20 years, many airline
officials, as well as others in the industry, fear that current federal intervention amounts to noth-
ing more than re-regulation. For a deeper analysis of this subject, see BRIAN F. HAVEL, IN
SEARCH OF OPEN SKIES: LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW ERA IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 222-
29 (1997).
4. See Exec. Order No. 13,015, 61 Fed. Reg. 43937 (1996). For the findings of this commission,
see generally WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY, FINAL REPORT
TO PRESIDENT CLINTON (Feb. 12, 1997) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
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ment travel rights, and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
rights of airline passengers under the United States Constitution.
The Gore Commission appears to have accepted, without examina-
tion, the commonplace notion that an increased threat to safety neces-
sarily creates a clash between our constitutional liberties and our need
for personal safety.5 The position taken in this Comment is that this
clash is illusory. The fundamental error of the Gore Commission was
the paternalistic notion that government can and should make airline
passengers safe.6 Both the Constitution and practical realities demand
that the government help airline passengers keep themselves safe, just
as the government works to help drivers keep themselves safe on the
highways. Paternalistic approaches to airline safety are both foolish
and un-American.
It is both unwise for individual members of the public to ignore
responsibility for their own safety, and unconstitutional for the gov-
ernment to implement security plans presuming that the public will do
so. Benjamin Franklin wrote, "[t]hey that can give up essential liberty
to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."'7
Experience shows that such cravens in fact generally experience what
Franklin observed. 8 The danger today is too great to tolerate a cow-
ardly and irrational response. We cannot afford to lose either safety
or liberty.9 The danger in the skies is real and serious, but it does not
5. The assumption that there is a necessary clash between an individual's constitutional rights
and safety seems to be accepted both by the political left and right. Justice Thurgood Marshall
criticized the political right when he wrote: "[h]istory teaches that grave threats to liberty often
come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure." Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Judge
Friendly, generally regarded as politically liberal, wrote: "[wihen the risk is the jeopardy to hun-
dreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of
a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness" for a search. United States
v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J., concurring).
6. The Gore Commission well illustrates the wisdom of Justice Brandeis, who wrote:
[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Gov-
ernment's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
7. Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania, in BARTLErr's FAMILIAR QUOTA-
TIONs 348 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 1980).
8. It was not in spite of our liberty, but because of it, that Americans in the 1930s and 1940s
were far safer than were most people, such as the Germans. Heavy-handed Nazi security may
have provoked, but could not prevent, the Hindenburg disaster. See infra notes 13-24 and ac-
companying text. Over the last two centuries, the prosperity and happiness enjoyed by Ameri-
cans has been based, in large part, on the safety that we enjoy. The Constitution works now, and
has consistently worked amazingly well, to assure our safety.
9. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (arguing
that the Constitution is antiquated and too inflexible to deal with modern dilemmas). However,
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force us to choose between bomb-toting terrorists and jack-booted se-
curity officers.
This Comment will begin in Part I with a summary of the history of
violent threats to airline safety and the responses by industry and gov-
ernment to these threats, and the Constitutional rights associated with
travel.10 Part II will present a theoretical structure for effective and
constitutionally sound government involvement in airline safety and
will make specific alternative recommendations for steps needed to
prevent terrorist attacks on air travel." In conclusion, Part III of this
Comment will re-emphasize that an individual, not a bureacracy, can
ensure airline safety.12
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background: The History of Terrorism
1. The Hindenburg
The first regular international air transit services were provided by
Lufthansa's dirigibles ("Zeppelins") in the 1920s between Frankfurt
and both New York and Rio de Janiero. a3 This service came to a vio-
lent end on May 6, 1937, in Lakehurst, New Jersey, with the explosion
the world of the founding fathers was not a genteel place of parlour and peace. Thomas Jeffer-
son and his contemporaries were well aware of the threat of terrorism. One of Jefferson's first
acts as President was to defy international pressure and dispatch naval vessels to destroy the
"Barbary Pirates" who were based in Tripoli and under the protection of governments there,
despite the fact that America was then a fledgling and weak power. See SAMUEL E. MORISON,
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 363-64 (1965). Jefferson did not wait for the
pirates to take sail and attack merchant ships. See id. Instead, he ordered the Navy to destroy
the pirate fleet in their own harbors. See id.
The parallels between modern terrorists often linked to Libya, whose capital is Tripoli, and the
Barbary Pirates are striking. Today the threat is, if anything, less severe because we have enor-
mous military and economic power on which Jefferson could not depend. It is unfair to suggest
that the founding fathers were blind to the need for strong, perhaps risky, action against terrorist
threats. On the contrary, Jefferson had unusual foresight. He could see what too many moderns
are afraid to see. He employed methods of protecting Americans that in no way threaten our
liberties, though they did threaten our international standing and demanded heroic and forceful
pre-emptive action. He risked a war, a tactic almost unthinkable to many people today. Cf.
Comments of Ken Quinn, infra note 213.
10. See infra notes 13-141 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 142-256 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
13. See MICHAEL M. MOONEY, THE HINDENBURG 54-56, 59, 63 (1972). Mooney's account is
based on interviews with survivors or examination of their diaries, and of voluminous official
United States and German records of the investigations after the explosion and many other
sources. See id. at 269-73. Many dirigible experts today reject Mooney's account as sensational-
ized, but his was the only independent study done on the disaster when interviews with witnesses
were still possible. See E-mail from John Dziadeck (Sept. 20, 1999) (on file with author) (main-
taining a group of web-sites commemorating dirigibles).
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of the world's largest airship, the Hindenburg, on its maiden voyage.' 4
A private investigation found that a bomb placed by one of the Ger-
man crewman exploded,' 5 setting the airship on fire and killing thir-
teen of the thirty-six passengers and twenty-two of the sixty-one crew
members, including the bomber himself.16 The disaster is still
shrouded in mystery, partly because both the United States and Ger-
man governments avoided public disclosure of the explosion's true
cause due to the embarrassment of having failed to prevent terror-
ism.' 7 The bomber 18 succeeded in destroying the airship even though
German security was warned of a threat to bomb the Hindenburg
when it arrived in Lakehurst 9 and three German S.S. Officers were
on board to ensure security.20 Security efforts failed because the S.S.
Officers, who were not competent to find the bomb themselves, 21
alienated the dirigible's crew,22 who were unwilling to believe that one
of their own would bomb the ship.23 German security efforts were
also misdirected because of suspicion of involvement by passengers
who were Jewish or had criticized the Nazi party.24 As will be dis-
cussed in this Comment, the response of the Gore Commission is
hauntingly similar to that taken by the United States and Nazi Ger-
many more than seventy years ago.
14. The Hindenburg explosion actually came seven years after the first recorded airplane hi-
jacking, which was in 1930 in Peru. See Sanford L. Dow, Comment, Airport Security, Terrorism,
and the Fourth Amendment: A Look Back and a Step Forward, 58 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1149, 1158
(1993). Revolutionaries hijacked a plane and used it to distribute leaflets. See id.
15. See MOONEY, supra note 13, at 216-18.
16. See id. at 258-59.
17. The Secretaries of Commerce and Interior both wrote to the American investigator that
-a finding of sabotage might be cause for an international incident . I...' Id. at 271. Nonethe-
less, "almost every dirigible man (including Captain Pruss)" who testified in the investigation "in
private agreed that sabotage was the cause." Id. During the investigation, "the German advi-
sors and the American commissioners and advisors held meetings at night to discuss, off-the-
record," how to minimize the "inescapable evidence of sabotage . I..." d. An American com-
missioner's diary, now in the National Archives, expressed that the recollections of the German
and American advisors were similar. See id. at 271-72. A clearer case both for the bombing and
for the governmental attempts at a cover-up could hardly be made, despite continued official
insistence that the actual cause of the explosion is a mystery. See id. at 271.
18. It appears that the bomber, Eric Spehl, was provoked by the torture of a friend by the
Gestapo. See id. at 217-18.
19. See id. at 115-18.
20. See id. at 110-16.
21. See MOONEY, supra note 13, at 258-59.
22. See id. at 152-56.
23. See id. at 11-12.
24. See id. at 123-26.
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2. Early Airplane Hijackings
Between 1949 and 1985, there were 498 successful and 281 failed
hijacking attempts worldwide 25 and 1539 persons killed in eighty-
seven aircraft bombings.26 Between 1948 and 1960 there were twenty-
nine successful hijackings around the world.27 Between 1961 and 1967
there were sixteen hijackings.28 But the year 1960 alone saw a record
thirty hijackings, seventeen of which were of United States-registered
aircraft.2 9 In 1963, the international aviation community responded to
this wave of hijackings with the Tokyo Convention, 30 which outlawed
dangerous acts on aircraft,31 and created the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization ("ICAO").32 The Tokyo Convention preserved na-
tional criminal jurisdiction over such acts and gave airline
commanders quasi-police authority. 33 The United States has been an
active signatory of the Tokyo Convention. 34
3. Establishment of the DOT and FAA
In 1967, the Department of Transportation ("DOT") was estab-
lished as the "focal point in the Federal Government for the coordi-
nated national Transportation Policy."'35 Additionally, the DOT was to
oversee "transportation safety improvements and enforcement. '36
25. See Michael S. Simons, A Review of Issues Concerned With Aerial Hijacking and Terror-
ism: Implications for Australia's Security and the Sydney 2000 Olympics, 63 J. AIR L. & COM.
731, 738 (1998).
26. See id.
27. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aerial Piracy and Terrorism: Unilateral and Multilateral Re-
sponses to Aircraft Hijacking, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 427, 429 (1987).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Convention on Offenses and Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963,
20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Tokyo
Convention].
31. See Haro F. Van Panhuys, Aircraft Hijacking and International Law, 9 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1, 1-2 (1970).
32. See Simons, supra note 25, at 740-41 n.43 (noting that the ICAO grew from 49 signatories
in its first year to 86 by 1969).
33. See Tokyo Convention, supra note 30, at arts. 3, 6.
34. Earlier conventions chiefly gave international approval to actions already being taken by
signatories. See generally Dionigi (Dan) M. Fiorita, Aviation Security: International Response, 3
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 267 (1993) (describing the Tokyo Convention and other conventions
dealing with aviation security). Later conventions strengthened sanctions against nations that
did not take strong measures against terrorists. See id.; see also Simons, supra note 25, at 739-50;
Heather E. Reser, Comment, Airline Terrorism: The Effect of Tightened Security on the Right to
Travel, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 819, 823-28 (1998). The United States is also a signatory of the
conventions that have continued the work of Tokyo Convention. See Fiorita, supra at 285-93.




Other areas currently under DOT's control are international transpor-
tation agreements and the continuity of transportation services in the
public interest. 37
The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), an operating ad-
ministration of the DOT, is responsible for "promoting safe air travel
and enforcing security measures affecting aircraft and air terminals. '38
Traditionally, the FAA has placed emphasis on promoting air travel,
but recently there has been a "paradigm shift" to focus on safety, and
especially counterterrorism. 39 Along with the independent National
Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB"), the FAA conducts safety
studies and investigations, usually after serious accidents. 40 While the
ultimate control over policies and regulations lies with the United
States government, airlines, airport owners and operators play an inte-
gral part in the aviation industry. Moreover, the airlines are typically
charged with funding security.41
4. Early United States Responses to Terrorism in the Air
In the late 1960s, the United States government reacted to the in-
creasing number of terrorist attacks by creating a special FAA task
force to implement strategies for detecting and deterring possible ter-
rorists. 42 The initial procedures called for heightened security meas-
ures against certain individuals by using profiling to try to identify
terrorists.43 A "profile" is a list of personal attributes that, though
when pinpointed individually may be legal and non-threatening, cu-
mulatively suggests a person is statistically more likely to hijack an
airplane.44 Unfortunately, despite implementation of this profiling
system, the number of attacks continued to increase. 45
Congress responded to the increasing threat of hijacking with a stat-
utory scheme that included the Anti-Hijacking Act of 197446 and the
37. See id.
38. Reser, supra note 34, at 829 n.54 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 472(i)-(m), (o) (1994)).
39. See Anthony Fainberg, Aviation Security in the United States: Current and Future Trends,
25 TRANSP. L.J. 195, 196 (1998).
40. See Rudolf Kapustin, How to Prevent Major Accidents Effectively, 10 AIR & SPACE LAW.
1, 12 (1996).
41. See Fainberg, supra note 39, at 197; see also Diane Westwood Wilson, The Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996, 11 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 10 (1997).
42. See Rogers, supra note 2, at 506.
43. See id.
44. See JIN TAI CHOI, AVIATION TERRORISM: REGIONAL VARIATIONS AND RESPONSES 30
(1994) (discussing the passenger profiling system).
45. See id. at 24 (noting that between 1968 and 1973 there were 125 hijackings of American
aircraft).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 93-885, at 9 (1974).
[Vol. 49:847
APPROACHES TO AIRLINE SAFETY
Air Transportation Security Act of 1974. 47 The Anti-Hijacking Act
made it illegal to carry a concealed weapon aboard an aircraft.48 The
Air Transportation Security Act called for a uniform mandate that all
carry-on luggage undergo screening procedures. 49 Instead of search-
ing a handful of passengers targeted for suspicion, the new system
would search everybody. These measures seem to have been effective
because air terrorism in the United States almost came to a halt. In
1972, the last year in which the United States only used profiling to
ensure safety, twenty-eight American airliners were hijacked. 50 Be-
tween 1975 and 1986 only two such aircraft were so threatened, and
only one of those, a TWA flight near Athens in 1986, originated in the
United States.51 The other was Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded
over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988.52 The bomb that destroyed Pan Am
Flight 103 seems to have been put on board the plane during a stop-
over in Frankfurt, Germany. 53 Thus, it appears that not a single bomb
has evaded airline security on American aircraft at United States air-
ports since all airports began screening passengers. 54
5. Reaction to Pan Am Flight 103
On December 21, 1988, somebody in Frankfurt, Germany loaded a
portable radio packed with explosives into his checked baggage on
Pan Am Flight 103. 55 He did not board the plane himself.56 The
plane exploded a few hours later over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all
259 people on board and eleven residents of Lockerbie. 57 As a result
47. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1356-1358 (1988) (repealed 1994).
48. H.R. REP. No. 93-885, at 1-5.
49. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1356-1358. See also Shirlyce Manning, Comment, The United States' Re-
sponse to International Safety, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 505, 510 (1996).
50. See ACLU Freedom Network, Profiling Endangers Privacy (visited Sept. 4, 1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/w100996b.html> [hereinafter Profiling Endangers].
51. See Gregory T. Nojeim, Aviation Security Profiling and Passengers' Civil Liberties, 13 AIR
& SPACE LAW. 3, 6 (1998).
52. See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 810 (2d Cir.
1994).
53. See id. at 811.
54. The moral of this experience is clear-low-level screening of everybody is effective. How-
ever, targeting a few people for intense heightened scrutiny is pointless. Those who are deter-
mined enough to construct an effective bomb are also almost inevitably also serious enough to
avoid behavior likely to single themselves out for special scrutiny.
55. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TERRORISM, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 13 [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT] (discussing the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103); see also Rogers, supra note 2, at 509.
56. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 55, at 13-14.
57. See id. at 14; see also Garret Hodes, Terrorist Threats: The Friendly Skies Aren't Too
Friendly About Notification, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 365, 366 (1998); Steven Mirmina, Aviation
Safety And Security-Legal Developments, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 547, 547-48 (1998).
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of this incident, President George Bush created the President's Com-
mission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.5 8 In response to the find-
ings of this commission, Congress implemented the Aviation Security
Improvement Act of 1990,59 requiring the FAA Administrator to
counteract terrorism by adopting new security technology. 60 United
States air carriers instituted a strict bag matching policy to remove the
baggage of any passenger who failed to actually board the flight. Cur-
rently, however, the policy applies only to international flights.61
While an important step towards thwarting the efforts of the terror-
ist using "drop and run" tactics, 62 the positive bag identification sys-
tem provides no assistance in preventing those determined to give up
their own lives for their causes. 63 Bag matching also provides no pro-
tection against those who place explosives in bags belonging to other
innocent passengers. 64
6. TWA Flight 800 and the Gore Commission
The debate over aircraft and airport security became most intense
in the aftermath of the TWA Flight 800 disaster. The mid-air explo-
sion over Long Island, New York that killed everyone on board was
initially blamed on terrorists.65 On July 17, 1996, a major change oc-
curred in the aviation industry because the disaster forged a consensus
regarding the need for drastic measures to stop terrorist activity.66
President Clinton promptly established the White House Commission
on Aviation Safety and Security on August 22, 1996, led by Vice Presi-
dent Gore.67 The Commission's focus was to assess and recommend
security measures to airlines and airports.68 The Commission's work
reflected its "vision for the future," namely, "[t]o ensure greater safety
and security for passengers, to restructure the relationships between
government and industry into partnerships for progress, and to main-
58. See Exec. Order No. 12,686, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,629 (1989).
59. Pub. L. No. 101-604, 104 Stat. 3066 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.).
60. See id.
61. See Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and Security: An Analysis of the
White House Commission's Recommendations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 791, 799 (1997).
62. A "drop and run" occurs when a terrorist checks luggage onto an airplane, but the terror-
ist does not board the plane. Id. at 793.
63. See id. at 798-99.
64. See id. at 798.
65. See Fainberg, supra note 39, at 195-96.
66. See id.
67. See Exec. Order No. 13,015.
68. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
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tain global leadership in the aviation industry. '69 Some of the recom-
mendations focused on new technology to be utilized for surveillance
and screening. 70 Recommendations also included training additional
bomb sniffing dogs, creating an automated passenger profiling system,
and dramatically increasing the FBI's workforce on counterintelli-
gence. 71
President Clinton hastily signed the proposal into law with a total
budget of $1.097 billion, of which the Commission was allocated
$429.4 million.72 The Commission's initial report was issued just forty-
69. Id. at 24. Notably lacking from this vision is the active and informed participation of the
general public and of passengers and crew. See id.
70. See id. at 31-47.
71. See id.
72. See The President's Counterterrorism Proposal (visited Jan. 29, 2000)
<http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/WH fact-sheet_10_96.html> [hereinafter President's Propo-
sal]. The proposal allocated (dollars in millions):
* Screen Checked Baggage, $91.1
* Screen Carry-on Baggage, $37.8
* Canine Teams, $8.9
* Augment FAA Security Research, $20
* Security Workforce, $18
* Vulnerability Assessments, $5.5
* Passenger Profiling, $10
* Screener Training, $5.3
* Screen Passengers (Portals) and Document Scanners, $1
* Anti-terrorism Assistance to Foreign Governments, $2
* Deploying Existing Technology to Inspect International Air Cargo, $31.4
* Provide Additional Air/Counterterrorism Security, $26.6
* Taggants Study, $21.3
* Explosives Detection Training, $1.8
* Capacity to Collect and Assemble Explosives Data, $2.1
* Improve Domestic Intelligence, $38.9
* Improve Forensic/Crisis Management Capabilities, $16
* Increased Staffing, $91.7
* Persian Gulf Force Protection, $122.6
* Overseas Physical Security Upgrades, $138.5
* Upgrade Overseas Security for the International Trade Administration, $9.4
* Enhance Security of Infectious Disease Laboratories, $23
* Department of Interior Facility Security and Training, $15.9
* Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Other Judicial Services, $10
* FBI: Building Security, $7
* United States Attorneys, $15.6
* Drug Enforcement Administration, $7
* Diplomatic Security, $23.7
* ATF: Critical Incident Response Teams for Post Blast Deployment, $7.2
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five days after the Commission was formed. 73 However, the Commis-
sion allocation of dollars was misguided because much of the informa-
tion needed to effectively counter terrorism simply does not exist.74
The profound lack of hard data that the Commission had to contend
" ATF: Additional Security for Federal Facilities, $6.7
* United States Secret Service ("USSS"): Additional Security Equipment, $1.1
* USSS: Equipment Replacement Related to Airplane Crash, $1.4
" Customs Service: Explosives and Radiation Detection Equipment, $2.2
" Overseas Building Security, $0.6
" Personnel and Protective Measures, $3.3
" Firefighter/Emergency Services Financial Assistance, $2.7
" Headquarters Building Security, $0.2
" Public Building and Museum Security, $7.3
" Facility Security, $2.5
" Other Treasury Department: Building Security, $14.7
" Expanding the Bureau of Export Administration's Efforts to Detect Illegal Exports,
$3.9
* Improve Technology to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling, $8
* FBI: Critical Incident Response Facility, $2
" Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), $15
" Other Justice Department Activities, $14.2
" Counterterrorism Fund, $35
" ATF: Inspecting Explosives Licensees and Permittees, $1.8
" Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, $4.1
" Salaries and Expenses, $6
" Emergency Fund, $1
" Enhance Nest Nuclear Counterterrorism Program, $15
* Research and Special Projects Administration ("RSPA"), $2.5
" RSPA: Advisory Committee on Surface Transportation Security, $0.5
" ATF: Expand Canine Training and Certification Program, $7.5
" ATF: Car Bomb Studies, $3
" ATF: Emergency Contingency Funding, $15
" ATF: Explosives Intelligence and Support Systems, $14.2
" Departmental Offices: Office of Foreign Assets Control: Seize Foreign Assets of
Terrorists and Terrorist-Sponsoring Organization, $0.3
" Office of Emergency Preparedness, $5.8
" Training, Awareness, and Information Programs, $93.1
* Consequence Management Planning and Coordination, $9.3
" Federal/State/Local Assessment, Training, and Exercises, $8.4
" National Foreign Intelligence
" Creation of a National-Level Foreign Terrorism Warning Group Within the
Counterterrorism Center
Id.
73. See Hahn, supra note 61, at 792.
74. See Nojeim, supra note 51, at 6.
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with is illustrated by the fact that the TWA Flight 800 explosion,
which had provoked the Commission's formation, was not actually the
result of terrorism at all. Closer investigation showed that defects in
the design of the central fuel tank appeared to be the probable cause
of the TWA Flight 800 tragedy.75
The Commission had invited the participation of the American
Civil Liberties Union,76 airport safety representatives, 77 and other avi-
ation officials.78 President Clinton proclaimed that as a result of the
new measures, "[n]ot only will the American people feel safer, they
will be safer."' 79 The President announced that he endorsed "zero tol-
erance" for airline terrorism.80 However, as will be argued later in
this Comment, the President's "zero tolerance" policy extends to a
countenance of massive invasions of individual privacy and to huge
monetary expenditures, but not to measures which would disrupt for-
eign policy or risk war.81
a. High-Technology Security Equipment
The FAA Act of 1996 authorized the purchase of fifty-four CTX-
5000 luggage scanners. 82 These devices cost more than a million dol-
lars each to be installed 83 and are able to screen only 120 bags per
hour. 84 The proposed plan is to use these luggage scanners in tan-
dem. 85 However, even if two scanners are used, a rate of 240 bags per
hour (under 3000 per twelve-hour daytime shift) is inadequate for the
number of passengers that pass through any major airport every day.
For example, in 1997, over 70 million passengers passed through Chi-
75. See Michael Grunwald, FBI Sought to Suppress Report on TWA Crash, WASH. POST, May
9, 1999, at A01, available at 1999 WL 17002020.
76. See ACLU Freedom Network, Individual Rights Have 'Low Profile' at Aviation Security
Conference (visited Jan. 15, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org/news/nl22597a.html>.
77. Interview with Richard Kunicki, Deputy Commissioner of Airport Security at Chicago
O'Hare International Airport (Dec. 11, 1998).
78. A commentator has noted that "[tihe White House has neither given a clear indication of
the effectiveness of these measures in preventing terrorist acts nor acknowledged the true cost of
implementation," including flight delays, constitutional violations, and establishing a precedent
for using taxpayer money to pay for airline security rather than requiring the airlines (who pass
the cost along to passengers) to bear this responsibility. Hahn, supra note 61, at 793.
79. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks By The President During White
House Commission on Aviation Safety Announcement: The Oval Office (visited Sept. 8, 1998)
<http://www.nitea.or.kr/www.whitehouse.govfWH/New/html/aviation.html>.
80. See id.
81. See infra notes 191-202 and accompanying text.
82. See Nojeim, supra note 51, at 5.
83. See Hahn, supra note 61, at 797.




cago O'Hare International Airport,86 which translates into an average
of 192,000 passengers each day. If each passenger averaged one or
two checked bags, a pair of CTX-5000 scanners could screen fewer
than one bag in a hundred. InVision, the company that manufactures
the CTX-5000, 87 has plans to produce faster models, but even if the
machines were ten times as fast, a pair of machines would still be
overwhelmed by the traffic at an airport such as O'Hare. Moreover,
the estimated cost to supply seventy-five of the United States' busiest
airports is $2.2 billion.88 Critics argue that CTX-5000 scanners have
the potential to cause false alarms and to scan a lower number of bags
than the FAA's intended amount.89
Technology beyond the use of X-ray vision, such as machines that
detect trace particles of explosives are currently being developed. 90
With the introduction of the CTX-5000s into airports, the marketplace
has experienced an increase in the number of companies interested in
design, production, and manufacture of new technology. For example,
BodySearch, developed by American Science and Engineering, and
largely funded by the FAA,91 is an X-ray device capable of seeing
through a person's clothing.92 One commentator aptly analogized the
BodySearch to Superman's X-ray vision. 93 It is conceivable that such
devices would be highly effective in preventing contraband from
boarding the aircraft. 94 The Commission did call for the purchase of
"upgraded X-rays, and other innovative systems. ' 95 Since November
of 1999, United States Customs has introduced the use of BodySearch
86. See CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION, THE CHICAGO AIRPORT SYSTEM: ANNUAL RE-
PORT 6-7 (1997).
87. See Fainberg, supra note 39, at 197.
88. See Hahn, supra note 61, at 798.
89. See id.; Fainberg, supra note 39, at 198-99.
90. See Fainberg, supra note 39, at 197. "[Alt least two other corporations, L3 Communica-
tions and Vivid Technologies, are seriously engaged in developing certifiable explosives detec-
tion systems." Id.
91. See Robyn E. Blumner, Welcome to the Unfriendly Skies (visited Sept. 8, 1998)
<http://www.aclufl.org/r-sky.htm>.
92. See id.
93. See id. Whether this type of search could withstand constitutional challenge remains to be
seen. Current plans do not call for the purchase of such devices in the United States for use on
passengers. See id.
94. However,
improved technology on the governments' part only encourages the same on the part of
terrorist groups, and they have kept up thus far. Therefore, it leads one to wonder
whether such provisions are merely means by which the government is trying to soothe
Americans citizens' fears, instead of being a ... solution.
Reser, supra note 34, at 832.
95. Blumner, supra note 91.
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for selected international passengers at many major American
airports. 96
b. Computer Assisted Passenger Screening
The Gore Commission also called for the creation of a national
database on passenger travel habits and history entitled the Computer
Assisted Profiling System ("CAPS"), for which funding to begin work
on this database has already been approved. 97 A test program has
been under development at Northwest Airlines for several years. 98
The FAA, commenting on CAPS, revealed that "[s]oon, if not al-
ready, airline agents who enter a passenger's name at check-in will get
either a red light or a green light" depending on whether the passen-
ger fits targeted profiles.99 Safety officials concede that profiling is
necessary because the existing technology is "inadequate in scanning
100% of the baggage." 100
Though the current proposed database includes only travel informa-
tion, it could later be cross-indexed with FBI, CIA, or criminal
records-or with vital statistics, family names, or credit histories.101
Civil libertarians fear the existence of a nationwide computer system
filled with details about personal backgrounds and behavior. 0 2 Such
96. See Scanning Equipment for Customs Searches is Set for Six Airports, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3,
1999, at BllE, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5463051.
97. See Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213
(1996).
98. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 37.
99. Interview with FAA Officer James Paget, a participant in the Gore Commission hearings
(Nov. 6, 1998).
The use of criminal records is especially troubling, since such records include arrests for which
no conviction followed and for situations in which the person involved is entitled to a presump-
tion of innocence. The constitutional right to due process requires that the state prove guilt
"beyond a reasonable doubt." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). But if a person was
subject to heightened security on the basis of profiles including arrests, he would be punished for
having been arrested-even if the arrests themselves were completely illegal. See Gil Klein,
FAA Steps up Airport Security, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Aug. 24, 1997, at All, available at
1997 WL 7627160.
100. Interview with Richard Kunicki, Chicago Department of Aviation Deputy Commissioner
for Safety (Nov. 18, 1998). See Fiorita, supra note 34, at 312.
101. See ACLU Freedom Network, Executive Summary of the House Terrorism Bill H.R. 2768
(visited Feb. 9, 1996) <http://www.aclu.org/congress/hr2768.html>.
102. See generally ACLU Freedom Network <http://www.aclu.org/> (chronicling cyberspace's
affect on privacy interests). This fear is not confined to the ACLU.
Employing a combination of psychological, sociological, and physical sciences to
screen, inspect and categorize unsuspecting citizens raises visions of abuse in our in-
creasingly technological society. Proposals based upon statistical research designed to
predict who might commit crimes and giving them the special attention of law enforce-
ment agencies is particularly disturbing.
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1100 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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a system could eventually form the basis of a coordinated data system
allowing officials to track almost every aspect of an individual's per-
sonal life and activities.'0 3
B. Constitutional Background
Airport security risks running afoul of the constitutional rights to
travel, to privacy, to protection from search and seizure, and to equal
protection. The possibility that airport security measures may have
already crossed these constitutional lines is demonstrated by class ac-
tion suits brought by minority passengers against United States Cus-
toms and airlines. 0 4
1. The Right to Travel
The right to travel under the Fourth Amendment is the most obvi-
ous right challenged by security measures that delay or potentially
prevent a person's air travel plans. Generally, the right to intrastate
or interstate travel has been regarded as fundamental and subject to
very few restrictions, whereas the right to international travel is sub-
ject to a somewhat greater level of interference. 10 5 For example, pass-
ports may be required for international but not for domestic travel.10 6
Justice William Douglas, writing for the majority of the Supreme
Court in Kent v. Dulles,107 stated that:
The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment .... [D]eeply engrained in our history [is] this freedom
of movement . .. [a]cross frontiers in either direction, and inside
frontiers . . . . Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of
values.108
However, the tone of the Supreme Court opinion in Haig v.
Agee,10 9 which allowed the Secretary of State to withhold a passport
from a renegade CIA agent, seems to suggest that the exceptions to
the "right" to travel may be so broad as to almost consume the right at
103. Abuse of such information would be almost inevitable, and the system itself could propel
us further into a situation in which our "virtual" identities overshadow our real existences and
behavior. See generally Michael Higgins, Looking the Part, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 48, 52 (stat-
ing that neutral criteria processed by automated security systems will affect minority travelers
disproportionately).
104. See Anderson v. Cornejo, No. 97-C7556 (N.D. I1. 1998).
105. See United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481, 482 (1967); see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 125 (1958).
106. See Laub, 385 U.S. at 481; Kent, 357 U.S. at 121-22.
107. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
108. Id. at 125-26.
109. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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least for international travel. 110 The Court wrote, "[t]he history of
passport controls since the earliest days of the Republic shows con-
gressional recognition of Executive authority to withhold pass-
ports."11 Authentic threats to national security justify restrictions on
international travel, 112 but even international travel rights cannot be
restricted based on spurious national security risks, such as a bare
claim that the traveler is a Communist. 1 3 International travel to and
from the United States is so common that it is impractical to closely
scrutinize every traveler.
2. Fourth Amendment Administrative Search Doctrine
It has been established that passengers have a Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in their carry-ons and luggage.11 4 However, partly to
accommodate the existing airport searches, an entire body of law has
evolved which allows administrative searches' 15 with little or no indi-
vidualized probable cause that the person being searched is dangerous
or has committed a crime.116 Though common today, such adminis-
trative searches would have clearly clashed with the understanding of
searches outside the authority of written warrants that existed at the
time the Constitution was written. 17 At that time, all searches re-
quired written judicial authorization except those directly incident to a
felony arrest."18
"[S]earches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme, done
in furtherance of administrative goals rather than to secure evidence
of a crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment without
a particularized showing of probable cause." 19 The government must
establish three elements. First, a compelling need for the intrusion
110. See id.
111. Id. at 293.
112. See id. at 302.
113. See Kent, 357 U.S. at 118, 130.
114. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1977) (holding that individuals have a
Fourth Amendment privacy interest in containers and bags).
115. See COMMITrEE ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SECURITY ET AL., AIRLINE PASSENGER SE-
CURITY SCREENING: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 35 (1996).
116. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (providing for
random sobriety stops of auto drivers). See also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (providing for routine drug testing of railway workers).
117. "[O]n its face, [the Fourth Amendment] states seizures of persons or their property re-
quire the issuance of a judicial warrant .... " JOHN F. DECKER, REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE DURING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA 35
(1992) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV). "[Wiarrantless searches and seizures are 'per se' unrea-
sonable .... " Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
118. See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 503 (2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes, J., concurring).
119. United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998).
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must be established. 120  Second, it must be shown that the intrusion
will be strictly limited to fulfilling that need.121 Third, it must be
demonstrated that the decision to search a particular person is not
subject to the discretion of the official in the field. 122
The power to conduct a search of another is a tremendous power
that carries with it a vast potential for abuse. 2 3 Thus, the courts must
determine whether an administrative search has expanded into an un-
lawful one.124 Courts have stressed the importance of keeping admin-
istrative searches from becoming "'infected by general law
enforcement objectives, and the concomitant need for the courts to
maintain vigilance.'"1 25 If the government is allowed to freely con-
duct discriminatory searches under the guise of an administrative
search, then "officials [will] routinely invade the privacy and property
of countless millions; hardly anyone [will escape] their clammy
grasp."'1 26
3. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments provide that the government shall not "make or enforce any
law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal
protection of the Laws.' 27 The courts have identified race, religion,
and national origin as suspect classifications that trigger equal protec-
tion analysis. 128 According to the FAA, the criteria used in profiling
do not involve such classifications. 12 9 However, equal protection anal-
ysis is proper regardless of whether the discrimination is directly ap-
parent from the words of a challenged law, from its administration, 130
or from its effect.' 3 ' Where a law has a discriminatory effect on per-
120. See United States v. $124,570 United States Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir.
1989).
121. See id. at 1244-45.
122. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
123. See United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
124. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 909 (9th Cir. 1973).
125. Soyland, 3 F.3d at 1316 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d
at 1244).
126. Id.
127. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
128. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954).
129. See Higgins, supra note 103, at 50 (reporting statement by FAA Spokeswoman Rebecca
Trexler).
130. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
131. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625 (1982). Under current procedures, profiled pas-
sengers are not themselves publicly searched. Instead, their baggage is subject to heightened
inspection. Kunicki Interview, supra note 100. Profiled passengers often have their luggage
tagged with a colored sticker, indicating to fellow passengers that they are marked individuals.
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sons belonging to a suspect classification, the law is subject to strict
scrutiny132 and can be upheld only if it is closely tailored133 to fulfill a
compelling governmental purpose. 134
4. State Action
Most security procedures at airports are carried out by employees
of the airlines. This presents two dangers. First, persons who are not
trained in law enforcement, and thus are not familiar with constitu-
tional rights of individual citizens, carry out activities that the courts
often disfavor even when performed by those who do have proper
training. 135 Second, airlines are private companies not directly bound
by due process requirements, even when acting on information pro-
vided by the government.136 However, the courts have ruled that pri-
vate airline employees are no different from public officials when
conducting a search.1 37 Constitutional restraints upon government
would be "severely undercut if the government were allowed to ac-
tively encourage conduct [prohibited by the government] by 'private'
persons or entities .... ",138 In United States v. Davis,139 a passenger's
briefcase was searched prior to boarding the aircraft by a ticket
agent. 140 The court noted, "[tihe search was part of the overall, na-
tionwide anti-hijacking effort, and constituted 'state action' for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. '141
Id. If the same group is consistently subject to public scrutiny, it may reinforce negative public
opinion about that group. Moreover, the group would suffer increased risk of prosecution for
crimes other people could commit without fear of detection. In both of these ways, profiling can
have a discriminatory effect.
132. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. For example, private security personnel perform personal searches on persons who fail
metal-detector tests at airport security. Kunicki Interview, supra note 100. West German au-
thorities so severely questioned the qualifications of private American security officers that in
the airport in Frankfurt, searches by American security were conducted out of sight of German
officials. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 55, at 32. French officials threatened to
limit the number of American security firms at Charles de Gaulle Airport on grounds that per-
sonnel "could themselves present a security risk." Id. at 33.
136. See Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1975).
137. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973).
138. Id. See Reitman v. Mulky, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74,
79 (1949).
139. 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
140. See id. at 896.




A. Profiling and Limits on the Administrative Search Doctrine
Given the strict limits on the administrative search doctrine, it
seems unlikely that the courts would approve of CAPS or the use of
profiling, even though the doctrine was developed partly for airline
searches. As to the first requirement of the administrative search doc-
trine-a compelling administrative need-profiling and follow-up
searches resemble existing, constitutional, security searches because
they serve the same administrative function as part of essentially the
same regulatory scheme to keep dangerous people and items off of
aircraft. 142 This function, of course, has a very high priority and will
justify far more intrusive behavior than would most administrative
purposes. 143
However, by limiting the searches to only certain individuals, profil-
ing approaches the forbidden line between administrative and crimi-
nal searches. Thus, it fails to satisfy either of the second two elements
of the administrative search doctrine-strict limitation to non-criminal
purposes and freedom from discretion of officers in the field. Profile-
based searches are likely to be used to attempt to track down and
provide evidence against suspected terrorists (and perhaps other
criminals as well), so that heightened security against certain individu-
als almost inevitably infects the regulatory scheme with criminal inves-
tigative purposes which cannot be supported by the administrative
search doctrine.
The profiling system was designed to remove some human subjec-
tivity by eliminating the choices of the personnel who identify persons
targeted for heightened security.144 After each passenger's name is
entered into a computer, the system makes a determination and
flashes a green or red light.145 The passenger is not told of this event,
and is subjected only to the same search as are all other passengers. 146
The process focuses on checked baggage rather than individuals. The
CTX-5000 is used on the bags, and if the bags are suspicious, they are
set aside for further scrutiny. For example, equipment able to detect
trace of explosives might be employed. In some cases, the bags would
142. See id. at 908.
143. See id.
144. Paget Interview, supra note 99.
145. See InVision Receives FAA Contract for Minimum of 54 and Up to 100 InVision CTX
5000 SP Explosives Detection Systems, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS-NEXIS
Academic Universe, Wire Service Reports [hereinafter InVision Receives FAA Contract].
146. Paget Interview, supra note 99.
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be opened. The intensity of the search would be based on the level of
suspicion.
Though workers in the field appear to have no choice in initiating
the process, because the computer makes this determination, field of-
ficers must decide whether to halt or continue the search at each of
the additional steps. They examine the CTX-5000 images and decide
whether what they see looks like a gun or another suspicious item.
Thus, field officers have almost complete discretion to choose the in-
tensity of heightened security, and nothing would prevent them from
using such discretion to satisfy human curiosity or to look for contra-
band not dangerous to a flight, such as drugs or ivory. Moreover, the
computer itself is analogous to a field officer. Even though it is not
human, it poses a similar threat as does a human agent and its actions
are not readily subject to judicial scrutiny.
Profiling is inherently impossible to monitor by the public or by
either legislative or judicial authorities. The same information that
the public or Congress would need to engage in an informed debate
about profiling, and that courts would need in order to determine
whether the profile used legal or illegal criteria, could be used by ter-
rorists to evade the profiles. Making profiles public is necessary to
make them legal, however, doing so would also destroy their
usefulness.
It is impossible to determine whether the profiles now in use in-
volve illegal criteria because the FAA has declined to publicize the
nature of the criteria.147 The FAA has emphatically denied that race,
ethnicity, religion, or gender play a role in the profiles. 148 The FAA
has merely noted that "it has to do with people's travel patterns and
how well they're known in the system.' 1 49 Such information is not
helpful in determining whether constitutional claims arise. Allowing
such profiling forces the American people and courts to take the FAA
at its word.150 Government action with no opportunity for review is
entirely outside our basic constitutional framework of independent
checks and balances upon all government power a.1 5
147. FAA spokeswoman Rebecca Trexler noted that making the profiles public "would be
telling the terrorist what we're looking for." Higgins, supra note 103, at 50.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 52.
150. The Gore Commission submitted its criteria for profiles to the Attorney General's Of-
fice, which determined that they are constitutional. Paget Interview, supra note 99. However,
such a review cannot facilitate public debate or judicial review of their constitutionality.
151. The "separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government.., is admitted
on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty .... THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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The Fourth Amendment is notoriously confusing, 152 and it is unrea-
sonable to expect security officers who are untrained as police officers
to exhibit the kind of sensitivity to individual privacy rights that the
Constitution demands. Courts and police alike have been accused of
inconsistently applying the doctrines underlying the Fourth Amend-
ment.1 53 Courts have carved out so many exceptions that the excep-
tions have virtually swallowed the rule. 154 Limited administrative
searches have been authorized for borders 155 and airports. 156
Professor Wayne R. LaFave, in analyzing the Fourth Amendment,
attempted to untangle the nine search and seizure decisions issued
during the Supreme Court's 1982-83 term. He proclaimed these cases
as a group, to be "illogical, inconsistent with prior holdings and gener-
ally, hopelessly confusing.' 57 Such decisions offer poor guidance to
those responsible for conducting administrative searches. Without un-
derstanding the individual Fourth Amendment protections at issue,
how can society meaningfully participate in debates about the future
of such protections in airline security?
While the Fourth Amendment does allow reasonable administrative
searches, there are limitations. "To meet the test of reasonableness,
an administrative screening search must be as limited in its intrusive-
ness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that
justifies it. ' '158 Due to long term ramifications of their decisions,159
courts must not merely consider just the facts of the case before them
but must consider all "searches permissible under the scheme."1 60
One of the greatest dangers of profiling is that it will expose certain
persons to an unusually high risk of exposure to seizures unrelated to
the purpose of keeping explosives off aircraft, for example under the
plain view doctrine. "The interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment are diminished when an object is found in plain view. ' 161 The
owner loses his expectation of privacy and "the owner's remaining in-
152. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468,
1472 (1985).
153. See id. at 1468.
154. See id. at 1473-74.
155. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976).
156. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).
157. Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible
Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOCY 1171,
1171 (1983).
158. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 968.
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terests in the object are merely those of possession and ownership. 1' 62
"The problem with the 'plain view' doctrine has been to identify the
circumstances in which plain view has legal significance rather than
being simply the normal concomitant of any search, legal or illegal
.... ,"163 The officer seizing objects in plain view must have a legal
right to be in that location and have a "lawful right of access to the
object itself."'1 64 Since profiles provide such "lawful right of access,"
certain persons are at an unfair risk of detection of criminal activity in
which others may engage with more impunity.
One federal court has noted a more serious problem with ex-
panding the administrative search doctrine in that it gives those favor-
ing more intensive searches leverage over the development of
constitutional law.165 As the government increases the intensity and
frequency of searches, the public's reasonable expectation of privacy
diminishes-and with it diminishes the concomitant constitutional pri-
vacy right. 166 Thus, in effect, investigators can use the administrative
search doctrine to justify ever-greater intrusions into the privacy of
individual citizens in areas totally unrelated to the original purpose of
the doctrine. For example, it is at least arguable that twenty years ago
a citizen had a reasonable expectation of privacy in closed luggage. 67
162. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (citation omitted).
163. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
164. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990).
165. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp 1077, 1089 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
166. In the end, "hardly anyone escapes [the] clammy grasp" of "government officials [who]
routinely invade... privacy." United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (holding that the seizure of
luggage for even 90 minutes outweighed law enforcement concerns). Judge Oakes' concurrence
in United States v. Edwards implicitly assumes that there is such a reasonable expectation that
would trigger Fourth-Amendment protections. 498 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes, J., con-
curring). That airport searches have already begun to erode such reasonable expectations is
shown by the fact that Judge Friendly's majority decision completely avoided the discussion of
such privacy expectations, and instead regarded the enormity of the danger implicit in air piracy
as making a search implicitly reasonable, stating that "[n]othing in the history of the [Fourth]
Amendment remotely suggests that the framers would have wished to prohibit reasonable meas-
ures to prevent the boarding of vessels by passengers intent on piracy." Id. at 498. This Com-
ment suggests that this observation evades the issue of the privacy of passengers who are not
pirates.
In Edwards, the defendant had been convicted of possession of heroin which could never have
endangered the flight or have been used as an instrument of air piracy. See id. at 497. The real
question, then, is whether the framers would have been troubled by the use of the danger of
piracy to excuse enforcement of laws having no logical relation to that piracy in ways which
would be otherwise impermissibly intrusive. One wonders whether Jefferson or Adams would
have objected to a warrantless search of baggage he carried to Liberty Hall in Philadelphia by
British officers intent on reducing the enormous Eighteenth century dangers of highway robbery
and sea piracy. Judge Oakes' concurrence in Edwards suggested the obvious answer is that the
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If, however, searches of such baggage can today be justified by the
administrative search doctrine, any such expectation would be unrea-
sonable. Thus, any search of luggage, whether or not related to the
administrative purpose, would face far less constitutional restraint
than such searches would have faced ten years ago. Widespread
searches already seem to have intimidated even citizens with good
reason to resist them. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has noted that, "[w]e think it strikingly unusual that so
many individuals stopped at airports consent to search while carrying
drugs. ' '1 68 Eventually, the administrative search doctrine could make
any expectation of privacy in any place unreasonable and, thus, com-
pletely obliterate the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.169
B. Practical Critique of Profiles
Only twice in the past twelve years has an American airliner faced a
terrorist attack and only one of those incidents led to an arrest.'70
This leaves officials with one known airline bomber from which to
make a profile. 171 Profiles used in the test program at Northwest are
not based on data about actual terrorists. The FAA developed the
criteria based on "consultations with a large number of security and
terrorism experts, who gave their assessments of the likely patterns of
behavior of individuals intending to attack civil aviation."'1 72 In other
words, the criteria are based on the opinions of experts rather than on
actual data.
Though failure to use real data might seem irresponsible, there is a
very good reason why no data was used-because none exists, and it
would be almost impossible to obtain such data even if a concerted
effort was made to do so. Most evidence of terrorist attacks is de-
stroyed in an airline crash, so that officials do not have enough infor-
mation to form a profile even if such a methodology could ever
succeed. 173 Moreover, there have been no terrorist attacks on Ameri-
framers would have objected on grounds that at the time warrantless searches were severely
limited to searches incident to a felony arrest. See id. at 502-03.
168. United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 598 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982).
169. It would effect a "systematic wrenching of the administrative search from its constitu-
tional roots." Soyland, 3 F.3d at 1318 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
170. See Nojeim, supra note 51, at 6.
171. See id.
172. Fainberg, supra note 39, at 200.
173. Even if circumstances did permit information-gathering, there is little assurance that "ex-
perts" would utilize it rationally. For example, the FBI gathered information about feminist
groups from 1969 to 1979. The FBI amassed a file of nearly 3,000 pages, including an account of
a meeting at which, according to the agents assigned, "[tihe Women, in general, appeared to be
hippies, lesbians or from far-out groups. Most of them were colorfully dressed, but the majority
[Vol. 49:847
APPROACHES TO AIRLINE SAFETY
can flights for more than twenty years.174 Even if data on terrorists
from the 1960s or from overseas were collected, such data would tell
little about behavior patterns in the United States today. Data about
non-aviation terrorists might be extrapolated for airline-terrorist
profiles, but a profile developed in this way would ultimately depend
on the reasonable but unverifiable assumption that air terrorists are
like other terrorists. Furthermore, such a profile would logically be
two steps removed from the person against whom it is directed. Not
only would the information used to justify searching a person not be
particularized to him or her as an individual, it would not even be
particularized to any group to which he or she actually belongs.
Rather, it would be particularized only to a different group assumed
to be similar to the one to which he or she belongs.
Profiling has been tried several times, always without success.1 75
The German S.S. profile for a potential bomber of the Hindenburg
made Jewish and dissident passengers suspects, but the actual bomber
proved to be a German patriot.176 Before the 1974 anti-terrorist legis-
lation provided for screening of all passengers, the airlines used a
manual profiling system similar to the automated system proposed by
the Gore Commission, but despite this profiling, hijackings continued
to increase in frequency.1 77
Both of these profiling schemes, like that proposed by the Gore
Commission, were based on poor information. Profiling has failed
even when security officers had accumulated excellent information.
Prior to the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, Pan Am knew that an anon-
ymous caller to the United States Embassy in Helsinki had claimed
that a Finnish woman would bomb a Pan Am flight from Frankfurt
during December of 1988.178 Pan Am merely used a profile identify-
ing Finnish women for heightened security and took no other special
security measures despite a number of other known similar threats.17
9
wore faded blue jeans. Most seemed to be making a real attempt to be unattractive." NATALIE
ROBBINS, ALIEN INK: THE FBI's WAR ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 327 (1992). Perhaps the
FBI might create a profile on this basis and search women who try to make themselves ugly or
who wear colorful clothing with faded blue jeans. Without judicial review of profiles, there is no
way to tell who or what will be targeted.
174. See Nojeim, supra note 51, at 6 (illustrating that in 1972, when profiling was used exclu-
sively, there were 28 hijackings on American aircraft, but since 1972, when all luggage began to
be X-rayed, there have been none).
175. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.




The murderous failure of these procedures is well known. 180 Perhaps
knowing that plans to use a female Finnish bomber had been revealed,
the terrorists employed a man of Arabic descent as a bomber in-
stead.181 Thus, even under ideal circumstances, with inside informa-
tion about the terrorists and their plans, profiling failed.
Common sense suggests that profiling will likely fail. Profiling has a
deplorable record in attempts to halt drug traffic into the United
States. 82 In order for profiling to work, terrorists must be unaware of
its use. Simply by planting a bomb on an unsuspecting passenger, a
terrorist can use that passenger who does not meet the profile to cir-
cumvent the airport security system. Terrorists will continue to seek
innovative ways to place bombs on an aircraft without having to take
it on themselves. The FAA has tacitly conceded the ineffectiveness of
its profiles by providing for some passengers to be subjected to height-
ened security by random selection. 183 It is likely that the random
checks will provide more deterrence than would profiles, since ran-
dom checks cannot be evaded. However, the existence of profiling
shows that the FAA is not content to rely on random checks alone,
since doing so reduces security to mere chance.
One group that has been noticeably affected by enhanced airport
security is the Arab-American population.1 84 Though there has never
been evidence tying the Middle East to the bombing of the Oklahoma
City Federal Building in 1996, public sources voiced suspicion of Mid-
dle Easterners immediately and Arab Americans faced increased de-
tentions and suspicion.185 The Council on American Islamic Relations
180. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
181. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 55, at 8-9.
182. "Profiling techniques used by the Customs Service do not stop the drug trade. If they
actually worked, drugs would not be coming into the United States." Profiling Endangers, supra
note 50. This does not reflect poorly on the personnel who are committed to protecting the
citizens of the United States from overseas dangers. This author had the pleasure to work
closely with immigration and customs officers for several years in O'Hare's International Termi-
nal, and can confirm that they are highly trained and experienced professionals. "Our inspectors
constantly strive to show courtesy and respect to all those whom they encounter." Interview
with Patrick Noonan, O'Hare International Airport Port Inspector, United States Customs Ser-
vice (Aug. 17, 1998). The problem inherent in profiling is not with the people who implement it.
It might be argued that profiling has helped fill American prisons with drug offenders. However,
it has not deterred the drug trade. Likewise, filling prisons with air terrorists caught by profiles
might be emotionally satisfying, but it will not keep airlines safe.
183. See InVision Receives FAA Contract, supra note 145.
184. See ACLU Freedom Network, Profiling of Fliers Raises Racial Issue (visited Sept. 26,
1998) <http://www.aclu.org/news/w092697d.html> [hereinafter Profiling of Fliers].
185. For example, Mr. Abraham Ahmad, an American of Jordanian descent, left Oklahoma
City at the time of the bombing. See Nojeim, supra note 51, at 8. In three United States cities he
was strip searched and interrogated, and then, after he reached London, he was forced to return
to the United States. See id. According to the ACLU account, other than the timing of his
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("CAIR"), which assists profiled Islamic Americans who feel their
constitutional rights have been violated, contends that profiling essen-
tially boils down to stereotyping.186 CAIR reported a 1000% increase
in complaints in one year by Islamic Americans who were detained,
searched, and questioned in American airports. 187 Even if the FAA
does not use religion itself as a criterion, among the factors that seem
to increase a person's likelihood of heightened security are place of
birth and the number of trips to Middle Eastern countries. 188 Natu-
rally, such factors indirectly single out Arab-Americans more often
than other Americans.
As discussed above, such discrimination could only be defensible if
it serves a compelling governmental purpose. 189 Though airline safety
is arguably a compelling purpose, the only purpose served by profiling
is cost-cutting, not airline safety. If the public purpose is zero-toler-
ance for terrorism,190 then everyone should be searched. This would
inevitably curb potential terrorism better than the use of profiles.
Targeting only certain individuals reflects a refusal to accept the mon-
etary and political cost of universal searches-and such a refusal is not
even an honest governmental purpose, let alone a compelling one.
C. Constitutional Alternatives to Ends Sought by the
Gore Commission
1. Theoretical Standpoint
To discourage terrorism, society must take steps to prevent ter-
rorists from achieving their objectives. Their long term goal, of
course, is not to kill Americans but to intimidate and alter behavior by
restricting freedom. Terrorists seek a world in which fear, not free-
departure from Oklahoma City there was no connection between Mr. Ahmad and the bombing,
and there was no credible evidence of his involvement. See id. He was subjected to humiliation
and gross inconvenience for no crime other than being an Arab-American man who left
Oklahoma City on an inauspicious day. See id.
One wonders what sort of profile would have identified the actual bomber. Timothy McVey
was a high school athlete and a decorated Desert Storm veteran with no criminal record. See
Dale Russakoff & Serge F. Kovaleski, An Ordinary Boy's Extraordinary Rage, WASH. PosT, July
2, 1995, at Al. "Many acquaintances had to struggle to think of something-anything-to relate
about him." Id. He was a survivalist who had assembled an arsenal to fight an apocalyptic
battle, but these activities were unknown to authorities and may not have even been illegal. See
id.
186. See Council of American-Islamic Relations (visited Sept. 8, 1998) <http://www.cair-net.org>.
187. See id.
188. See Higgins, supra note 103, at 52.
189. See supra notes 105-141 and accompanying text.
190. See Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-604, 104 Stat. 3066
(1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
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dom, is the rule. When government restricts freedom to fight terror-
ism, it actually carries out the objectives of the terrorists. Such
appeasement encourages terrorism.191
A Chinese proverb recalls that the purpose of terror is "[t]o kill one
and frighten 10,000 others. '192 The objective of terrorism is to create
fear. To overcome terrorism, society simply must not become fright-
ened. Terrorists crave fear, and it is this that we must always refuse to
allow them. Thus, stopping terrorism is not chiefly a matter of secur-
ity measures, but of social courage and education. It cannot be done
by government, but must be done in the hearts and minds of Ameri-
can people who say to themselves "we will never fear that" and say it
to the world loud enough for the terrorists to hear.
Real security measures can enhance our fearlessness,' 93 but meas-
ures such as those proposed by the Gore Commission are obviously
motivated by fear, and as such they feed the craving of terrorists. If
we are so fearful that we allow our government to restrict our free-
dom and carelessly spend our billions, we tell the world how fright-
ened we are and we tell the terrorists that for every one they kill, they
can frighten and intimidate ten thousand. A government band-aid
presenting a faqade of safety cannot be a substitute for individual
Americans taking responsibility for our own safety and demonstrating
our unwillingness to be intimidated. Such band-aid measures, when
they impinge on individual freedoms, send the wrong message to ter-
rorists and actually repress the exact kinds of personal courage which
spark the only realistic hope of stopping terrorism at its roots.
World tensions and the increasing availability of weapons of mass
destruction1 94 make terrorism as great a threat today as it has ever
been in the United States. Current political sentiment suggests that
drastic action is called for to address security concerns. Rather than
191. One commentator has said:
It is wrong to allow yourself to be intimidated, because if you do so you encourage
intimidation. If somebody is pointing a gun at your head, it is essential to consider the
fact that death is perhaps unavoidable and that therefore avoiding death is no longer a
rational objective, but that other objectives (especially the preservation of freedom and
self-respect) may still be attainable. The only moral response to such violent threats is
to say, "go ahead and shoot. I will never do what you want."
Interview with Eirik Marr Johnson, Parliamentarian, self-confessed "freedom extremist," and an
attorney member of the Illinois ACLU (Aug. 12, 1998).
192. Dow, supra note 14, at 1152 n.12.
193. Fear is not the same thing as an apprehension of danger and steps taken to reduce it. The
law is careful to distinguish between fright, an emotion having no legal significance, and appre-
hension, which gives rise to the tort of assault and may justify self-defense. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 24 cmt. b. Fear encourages terrorism, whereas rational action based on
apprehension can reduce terrorism.
194. See Dow, supra note 14, at 1049-51.
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exploiting such sentiment as an excuse to erode constitutional rights
and fatten existing bureaucratic budgets, this sentiment must be har-
nessed to create a truly safe airline system.
Heavy-handed security measures provoked but could not prevent
the most famous airline disaster in history-the destruction of the
Hindenburg-and the consequent destruction of pre-war interna-
tional air travel.195 The Gestapo was not concerned with American-
style privacy rights. 196 It was the paternalistic insensitivity of German
security measures, not individual rights, which prevented the German
S.S. from making the Hindenburg safe. 197 Twenty-First Century
America cannot afford to make the security mistakes of Depression-
era Nazi Germany. 98
The Constitution is a blueprint for effective strategies whereby
Americans may secure our personal safety, rather than a barrier to
such strategies. There is no need to make a trade-off between safety
and constitutional freedom. An unconstitutional reaction to terrorism
is, by its nature, an ineffective reaction, both because it ignores the
accumulated wisdom of the Constitution and because such an ap-
proach will face constant, inevitable, and rightful opposition.
The most powerful tool America has against terrorism is the willing
assistance of American individuals. Heavy-handed government intru-
sion into the travel lives of Americans will serve chiefly to create a
hostile relationship between travelers and the officials responsible for
protecting them, 99 and thus would squander our most powerful anti-
terrorist asset-the goodwill and intelligence of American travelers.




199. Even existing security procedures have created an adversarial relationship between pas-
sengers and officials. Following the filing of a class action lawsuit by nearly 50 African American
females against United States Customs at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, both Sena-
tors from Illinois took notice. Letter from Sens. Carol Moseley-Braun and Richard Durbin to
Acting Comptroller General James F. Hinchman, General Accounting Office (June 9, 1998). In
that letter to the General Accounting Office ("GAO"), the Senators requested "review of the
United States Customs Service search seizure procedures at O'Hare Airport." Id. According to
the letter, the Senators were concerned "about the consequences of using profiles that have the
potential to invade the privacy of innocent Americans." Id. Further, the letter asked that the
strip search techniques also be "reviewed for their efficiency in relation to other means of finding
contraband." Id. The following day the Senators jointly released a press statement to voice their
concern with the current practices. Press Release, Sens. Carol Moseley-Braun and Richard J.
Durbin (June 10, 1998). When questioned about criteria used by airlines, the DOT reported that
"no airline has been ... cited for discriminating in its searches .... Higgins, supra note 103, at
52. The FAA denies "emphatically" that criteria such as ethnicity, gender, or religion are in-
cluded in its profiles. See id. at 50. However, an American Airlines' document advised its em-
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The personal rights in the Constitution can and should serve to ad-
vance the cause of safety. Constitutional safeguards prohibit only pa-
ternalistic safety strategies based on the premise that individuals must
be important pawns in a game played between terrorists and safety
officers. The Constitution prohibits the government from using such a
game-playing model in constructing safety strategies. Whatever the
details of constitutional doctrine, the essence of the Constitution is
individualistic. Americans cannot be deprived of an effective individ-
ual role in securing their own safety. Such an individual involvement
in safety is both constitutionally required and the only sound basis for
effective security measures. Unfortunately, the recommendations of
the Gore Commission on aviation security and safety reflect an
unquestioning acceptance of the game-playing model and largely ig-
nore not only individual constitutional rights, but also the wiser strate-
gies enjoined by the Constitution. The Commission has both failed to
make us safe and to make acceptable inroads into our constitutional
rights.
The Gore Commission's acceptance of profiling betrays its lack of
concern for public involvement in safety. The profile can only be ef-
fective if it is kept secret from the very people whom it is supposed to
protect. There is no way for travelers to take any role in implement-
ing a profile-based security structure. The Gore Commission's reac-
tionism is remarkably similar to that of officials during early hijacking
days. As discussed above, in 1972, the FAA mandated air carriers
create (within seventy-two hours) an "acceptable" screening system
"to prevent ... devices or weapons in carry-on baggage or on ... the
persons of passengers. 2 0 0 In 1972, passengers were subjected to a be-
havioral profile, a magnetometer, identification check, and physical
search.201 Likewise in reaction to what was believed to be a terrorist
attack, the Gore Commission hastily acted on legislation to take im-
mediate measures to secure safety. In the 1970s, real safety-both
from terrorists and from threats to the Constitution-was achieved
only when profiling was abandoned and everybody was searched.
Likewise, real security today requires evenhanded searches of
everybody.
Real security procedures directed at real threats are both constitu-
tionally more sound and practically more effective than are the steps
proposed by the Clinton Administration and now enacted into law as
ployees to give closer scrutiny to "those with Arab-sounding names who don't carry U.S.
passports." Profiling of Fliers, supra note 184.
200. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting 37 Fed. Reg. 2500-01).
201. See FAA Press Release No. 72-26 (Feb. 6, 1972).
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the 1996 FAA Reauthorization Act. Flying is still one of the safest
forms of travel, but terrorist threats are likely to increase in the near
future.20 2 Due to the recent terrorist threats and bombings of United
States embassies, the need to improve existing security at airports is at
an all time high. It is possible that a combination of the steps outlined
below are likely to realistically improve airline security. Some of
these proposals may seem utopian, but since large outlays of money
have been authorized, it ought to be spent constitutionally and
effectively.
2. Specific Safety Recommendations
a. Improve Existing Safeguards
Existing airline security measures have proven to be amazingly ef-
fective.203 Before gaining computer capabilities, airlines relied on
manual screening procedures. In fact, El Al wages the most aggres-
sive visual screening campaign in the industry. One of the most tragic
aviation stories told is that of an Irish national who attempted to
board an El Al flight at Heathrow airport on April 16, 1986.204 After
repeated questioning by the ticket agent, the passenger was pulled to
the side so a search could be conducted of her baggage. 20 5 Inside the
lining, her Palestinian fianc6 had inserted a bomb, presumably to ex-
plode mid-air and kill his fiancee and unborn child.20 6 It is unlikely
that any automated system would have identified this passenger, but
an alert airline employee did. Alert passengers might be able to do
the same if they were empowered and informed. The use of suspi-
cious, even if innocent, behavior is less paternalistic than is profiling
when used to intensify investigation because it is particularized to the
individual who is then investigated, and the investigation is thus partly
under his control.
Hence, the most reasonable step in improving security is to see
what has worked and do it even better. One potential weakness in the
existing system is that most security personnel are poorly paid and
202. See Nadine Strossen, Check Your Luggage and Liberties at the Gate (visited Feb. 8, 2000)
<http://www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/issuel00/item4464.asp>.
203. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
204. See Faye Bowers, Ground Personnel: Gap in Airport Security System, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MON., Aug. 7, 1996, at 1.
205. See id.
206. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 55, at 169 (repeating testimony given by




trained,20 7 which increases the risk that they could be bribed, fooled,
or infiltrated by determined terrorists.2 08 Thus, the most important
thing we can do to make airports more secure is to improve the pro-
fessionalism, training, and screening of security personnel. The Gore
Commission recommended seven times as much funding to protect
the FBI and DEA buildings as it allotted for training security workers
in detecting explosives.20 9 Profiling received five times as much fund-
ing as did training for the whole country. 210 In all, training airport
security officers accounts for only 2% of the total package signed into
law by President Clinton, and little of the other funds will likely to be
devoted directly to improving the skills and circumstances of the
front-line officers charged with airline security.2t'
A second potential weakness of the existing system concerns the
"secure" areas of many airports. These areas that can only be entered
after submitting to security checks are very large, making them impos-
sible to monitor and allowing non-passengers to enter. For example, it
is not possible to enter many of the restaurants and other attractions
at many airports without passing security. This means much of the
security effort is devoted to people who never board airplanes. Either
the secure areas should be made much smaller and access to them
should be limited to passengers and those assisting them, or else small
heightened security enclaves limited in these ways should be created
within the existing larger secure areas of airports.212 Perhaps final se-
207. This problem presents danger not only to civil liberties, which may be ignored by
unknowledgeable guards, but also to safety itself. This is an illustration of the central contention
of this Comment-that proper respect for civil liberties often enhances rather than weakens
security. Properly-trained guards demanded by the Constitution would also provide better se-
curity. The inability of existing guards to do their jobs is demonstrated by numerous breaches of
airport security, such as the August 26, 1999 incident at the United Terminal at Chicago O'Hare
International Airport, in which "[a] man carrying a tan canvas bag ran past an unarmed security
guard .. .prompting evacuation of 6,000 people .. .during one of the busiest times of the
day ...." Gilbert Jimenez & Frank Main, Chaos at O'Hare, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at 1.
208. The vulnerability of security personnel to security lapse is highlighted by the recent scan-
dal at American Airlines involving a massive conspiracy to bring guns and drugs into the country
from Latin America on American Airlines planes by 58 airline employees and Department of
Agriculture employees, and officers of both the INS and local Sheriff's Department. See Edito-
rial, Airline security lax, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at N49.
209. See President's Proposal, supra note 72.
210. See id. Each bureaucracy received seven million dollars to defend its headquarters. Ap-
proximately two million was earmarked for training. See id. Ten million dollars was invested in
profiling. See id.
211. See id. Training accounts for approximately two million dollars of a budget of about a
billion dollars. See id.
212. The cases that authorized administrative searches date to the 1970s when searches were
made only of passengers and only almost immediately before boarding. See United States v.
Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1973). These factors were considered by the courts that al-
lowed such searches. "Near the entrance to the boarding gate were two large signs, plainly
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curity checks could be made on the aircraft themselves after all pas-
sengers have boarded. Existing security equipment has been
effective, 213 but improved explosives technology could enable well-fi-
nanced terrorists to evade the equipment, and therefore the technol-
ogy of detection equipment must keep pace.
b. Resolve Problems With Tracking Checked Baggage
The age-old problem of lost or delayed checked baggage must also
be solved. Fearing delays and lost baggage, many passengers chose to
carry-on their bags.214 Such bags are not only security risks, but they
can endanger the plane itself or the passengers in a crash. 215 Bag
matching to assure that passengers board the same flight as their bag-
gage would both improve baggage service and prevent the tactics that
led to the Lockerbie disaster.216 However, imposing bag matching on
the current muddle of domestic bag handling would dramatically slow
flights.217 Therefore, the current system must be improved, both to
insure the safety of the checked baggage through bag matching as well
as encourage passengers to use the checking system and reduce their
warning, among other things, 'PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE SUBJECT TO SEARCH.'"
United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499 (2d Cir. 1974). In addition, "an employee an-
nounced over a loudspeaker that ... all carry-on baggage would be searched." Id. The court
regarded this as important since it allowed those objecting to the search to turn away and not
take the flight. See id. However, today many airports do not search passengers immediately
before they board the planes. Instead, large areas of the terminals are designated as security
areas. This drastically expands the physical area over which a citizen cannot avoid a search
compared to that allowed in cases such as Edwards. Current practice is both potentially less
effective and more constitutionally objectionable than that which was originally approved. The
chief advantage is probably financial.
213. American security efforts have been intensive and largely effective. An attorney and
former FAA employee who has strong concerns for both security and the Constitution has ex-
pressed intense respect for the system currently in place to protect American air travelers. Inter-
view with Ken Quinn, Attorney and Former FAA employee (Dec. 13, 1998). Mr. Quinn points
out that the heavy hand of American power should descend upon those who threaten us, not
upon American citizens. See id. In many cases, we know who threatens us and how, but fail to
take action against them owing to other national agendas. See id. A true policy of zero toler-
ance for terrorism demands that we strike hard and fast when we know who threatens us, even at
the cost of other important foreign-policy objectives. See id. Part of the price we must pay for
security is not our own individual freedoms, but perhaps in a reduced flexibility in foreign policy.
See id.; see also supra note 9 (discussing Jefferson's forceful response to the terrorism of his day,
namely piracy).
214. This concern has led to strict controls on the size, number, and weight of carry-on bags.
215. See Kapustin, supra note 40, at 1-2.
216. See N.J. Strantz, From Technology to Teamwork: Aviation Security Reform Since Pan Am
Flight 103, 3 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 235, 251 (1993).
217. One hundred percent bag matching using the current technology would "cripple the sys-
tem." Kunicki Interview, supra note 77.
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dependence on unsafe carry-on bags.218 Perhaps the computer re-
sources that the Gore Commission would utilize to profile passengers
could instead be employed to track checked baggage.
c. Reduce the Adversarial Nature of Security Procedures
Almost all passengers are deeply concerned about safety and would
be anxious to actively assist in preventative measures. Systems which
force passengers to submit against their will and which humiliate or
otherwise offend them transform willing and able potential assets in a
safety system into enemies.2 19 Actions which alienate passengers by
violating their rights are, by nature, bad for security, because they pre-
vent passengers from using their abilities to enhance security.
There is a famous story alleging that a group of terrorists caught
before they had done any damage, said to their captors, "today, we
were unlucky. But remember, we only have to be lucky once. You
will have to be lucky always. '220 This story is used to justify extreme
security measures, since being lucky every time is not an easy task.221
But conversely, consider if the story involved a victim who had just
failed to prevent a terrorist from foiling his violent plot. The victim,
too, could say, "we only have to be lucky once." Part of the danger of
terrorism is that there are always more potential terrorists than there
are security officers. But it is equally true that there are always more
passengers than there are hijackers. Relying on a handful of outnum-
bered "experts" for security is as hopeless as the famous story above
suggests. However, were such experts to marshal the eyes, ears, and
intelligence of every passenger against terrorism, the odds would be
reversed in safety's favor.222 There are many things passengers can
and would do to enhance security if only they knew how. The most
218. It appears that some of the money already allocated for implementation of the Gore
Commission recommendations could be earmarked for these purposes. See President's Propo-
sal, supra note 72. It ought to be.
219. For example, hundreds of young Japanese-American men who escaped relocation camps
during World War If proved their American loyalty by joining the armed forces and becoming
war heroes. Yet, authorities had found the task of individually assessing the threat posed by
individual Japanese-Americans overwhelming and had lumped them all into a single "profile."
See FRANK F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANESE-AMERICANS 143-81
(1976).
220. Thomas Strentz, A Terrorist Psychological Profile Past and Present, 57 FBI L. ENFORCE-
MENT BULL. 13, 16 (1988) (quoting WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1984, at Al) (reporting the comments
of an Irish Republican Army member).
221. See id.
222. This author does not propose arming passengers and having them shoot it out with hi-
jackers. Keeping guns out of passengers' hands was part of the 1974 legislative anti-terrorist
program. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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important step would be to require airlines and the FAA to inform
passengers and crew about known terrorist threats.223
Just as public awareness of seat belt use and drunk driving has made
auto travel safer 224 in the United States and has allowed individuals to
assume a greater degree of responsibility and control for their own
safety and that of others. Similar programs could enhance airline
safety. For example, most passengers are unaware that the chief dan-
ger of leaving baggage unattended is that the baggage could be tam-
pered with by terrorists. Passengers fear only that it will be stolen, a
risk which they feel it is their own right to take. Thus, law-abiding and
conscientious citizens sometimes leave bags alone for a few moments
and trigger an expensive and ultimately pointless utilization of secur-
ity resources because airport personnel must report the bag, and both
local police and federal officials must respond.225 Most airports al-
ready have television monitors installed that passengers watch while
waiting or collecting baggage. Such monitors ought to provide practi-
cal information which passengers could use to help make themselves
and their fellow passengers safer. Few of us would recognize what was
happening even if we were watching a terrorist opening a suitcase and
activating a bomb. We have a right, and a need, to know what to look
for.
There is no convenient, standardized system whereby passengers
can become proactively involved in their own safety, such as a mecha-
nism for reporting behavior that seems dangerous or suspicious. Stan-
dard questions asked of passengers should be expanded to help them
know what to look for, not only in their own baggage, but in their
surroundings. If passengers were advised to be observant and be-
lieved that their observations would be valued and acted upon, people
would take care to watch baggage and would report those who do not.
This would both increase security and reduce the burden on security
resources that could be more effectively used otherwise.
Part of the problem stems from the FAA's attempt to make people
feel safe about air travel, which has resulted a rather paternalistic ap-
proach to air safety. The FAA has avoided public education as a
means of enhancing travel safety since public discussion could make
people feel that air travel is unsafe.226 Unfortunately, the Gore Com-
223. Such a proposal is outlined in greater detail by Hodes, supra note 57.
224. See generally National Highway Transportation Safety (visited Feb. 29, 2000)
<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov.html> (announcing results and additional grant funding for greater
auto safety).
225. Kunicki Interview, supra note 77.
226. The FAA received several warnings about threats to Pan Am Flight 103 up to two weeks
before the bombing took place, but Pan Am allegedly refused to tell the pilots for fear the pilots
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mission has uncritically adopted rather than challenged this
approach. 227
The FAA's paternalistic attitude sometimes extends beyond the
passengers even to air crew. For example, in November of 1974, TWA
Flight 514 crashed into Mt. Weather as it approached Dulles Interna-
tional Airport, killing all ninety-two people on board.228 Just six
weeks earlier, a United Airlines DC-8 had been cleared to land on the
same flight path.229 It cleared the peak by approximately thirty
feet.230 The FAA showed little interest, but the pilot and copilot were
concerned when they discovered how close they had come to disas-
ter.231 The FAA assured the pilots that air traffic controllers could
and would prevent such an event from happening again.232 Neverthe-
less, the FAA did not distribute information about the danger.233 Had
the FAA made a priority of informing the airlines and flight crews of
the danger, it is likely that the pilots on Flight 514 would have known
to avoid the danger and could have protected themselves and their
might become "jittery." See Pagnucco v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 37 F.3d 804, 820 (2d Cir.
1994). Though Pan Am's failure violated FAA rules, the FAA created a climate in which such a
failure was normal. See id. The United States Ambassador and Embassy staff in Moscow re-
ceived warnings about the attempted Pan Am bombing, in order to make the information public
through the FAA, but because of a procedural error, the FAA completely failed to respond to
the Embassy. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 55, at 9-10. The 1990 Presidential
Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism concluded that the agency "failed to facilitate
the timely exchange of information and guidance from headquarters to the field and from the
field to headquarters." Id. at 58. It appears that Pan Am's security official intentionally buried
the FAA warning under other papers on his desk and then attempted to falsify some of the dates
on them to cover his tracks. See Hodes, supra note 57, at 367. It appears that neither the FAA
nor Pan Am ever considered telling the public. See id. Had this threat become public, it is likely
that no pilots would have been willing to fly the plane, and few if any passengers would have
been willing to board it. There could have been no disaster because the plane would have never
taken off. The cost in terms of disrupted travel plans and in embarrassment to Pan Am and to
the American industry would have been enormous, but would have been counted in dollars, not
innocent lives. This-not limits on our freedom-is the true kind of cost which must be accepted
to attain zero tolerance for air terrorism. It is interesting to note that known threats to the
Hindenberg were also kept secret for many of the same reasons that operated in the Pan Am
disaster. See supra notes 13-24, 55-64 and accompanying text. Little, if anything, seems to have
been learned between 1937 and 1988. In both cases, the disasters could have been avoided by
public disclosure of known threats but were used to justify increasingly heavy-handed security
measures instead.
227. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 4 (neglecting to recommend public education as
a means of improving security).
228. See Kapustin, supra note 40, at 12.
229. See id. at 13.
230. See id. at 12-13.
231. See id. at 13.
232. See id.
233. See id.
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passengers. Rather than lose control of the situation or admit that
danger existed, the FAA chose to keep everybody ignorant.234
That is the same approach taken by the Gore Commission, and it
will not work. Nobody would crash into a mountain known to be
there, and nobody would fly on a plane known to be unsafe. Knowl-
edge is the best security. The true balance that must be struck in air-
line security is not between danger and personal liberties, but it is
between the risk of danger and costs to the airline industry of making
threats known so that passengers and crew can avoid them.
d. Ombudsmen
One of the major obstacles a passenger faces in traveling is where to
get information on how to log a complaint or report suspicious activ-
ity. With all of the different local, state, and federal agencies at work,
it is often difficult to determine which office is the right office to han-
dle the matter. Thus, a twenty-four hour central office, providing
ombudsmen between the passengers and airport operators, federal
agencies and airlines, would ease the flow of disseminating informa-
tion and expedite the process of making a report.
The ACLU maintains an on-line complaint form that is accessible
through its web-site. 235 Using this form, the ACLU has attempted to
remove some of the bureaucratic complexity of registering a com-
plaint against an official. The ACLU uses the data from the com-
plaints to determine whether discriminatory or abusive patterns
exist.236 The web-site, however, is not intended for reporting suspi-
cious behavior or for obtaining safety information, and so functions
only to report unconstitutional behavior-not dangerous activity.
e. Enforceable Passenger Bill of Rights
Airport screening searches are valid only if they recognize the right
of a person to avoid search by electing not to board the aircraft. 237
Many passengers traveling through the airport do not understand
their rights as passengers.238 Furthermore, even most lawyers today
would not guess that complaints about security abuses should be filed
234. See Kapustin, supra note 40, at 13.
235. ACLU Freedom Network, Passenger Profiling Complaint Form (visited Feb. 7, 2000)
<http://www.aclu.org/forms/complaint.aviation.html>.
236. See ACLU Freedom Network, As Airlines Debut Profiling System, ACLU Launches Web
Complaint Form (visited Sept. 4, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/news/n123197a.html>.
237. See United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1289-1290 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United
States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
238. The Gore Commission apparently put low priority on passenger rights by completely
neglecting the issue in the Commission's report. The Commission's report spoke in terms of
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with an obscure branch of the FAA. Therefore, next to signs explain-
ing prohibited activity in airports, 239 there should be a comparable
sign detailing your rights in an airport. For example, administrative
searches in an airport should be publicly defined so that passengers
can know if the searches to which they are subjected exceed legal
bounds. Since X-ray security devices have been in place for twenty
years, as travelers, we expect to place all carry-ons on the X-ray
machine and to empty change from pockets and remove watches, but
it is unclear where such actions cross the line and become a search.240
Such rights must be enforced by an independent agency similar to the
United States Equal Opportunity Commission, whose agents should
include the on-site ombudsmen described above,2 41 available to assist
passengers in protecting themselves, to inform passengers of both
their rights and duties, and to reduce friction by creating a safe travel
environment.
f. Bifurcated Airline System
The essential constitutional objection to security procedures is the
passenger's lack of choice and the basic practical objection is cost.
Yet, given a choice most travelers would willingly submit to security
procedures and would also be willing to pay for them. Thus, one se-
curity solution would be to create a bifurcated airline system giving
passengers a constitutionally and economically meaningful choice.
Some flights would have full security while remaining flights would
not. This would allow passengers a choice of taking the cheaper flight
and risk security, and asserting their constitutional rights, or taking a
pricier flight, surrendering such rights, and obtaining greater security.
Though such a system would solve almost all constitutional and practi-
cal security problems, at least on the secure part of the system, it
would be expensive to create and maintain, and administratively diffi-
cult to double all flight opportunities as the system would require.
zero tolerance for terrorism rather than in terms of passengers' rights to a safe flight. See FINAL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.
239. Airports are known for abundant and often confusing signs. In recent years, many air-
ports have posted signs reading "No laughing matter," and threatening arrest if passengers so
much as mention bombs, pirates, or any other threatening words.
240. The administrative search doctrine evolved partly from concerns that searches under
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967), might not suffice to allow effective airline searches. See Rogers,
supra note 2, at 512-13. Under Terry, a peace officer who has a "reasonable suspicion" of the
commission of a crime, supported by "articulable facts," may stop and briefly detain a person
and search for weapons and contraband. 392 U.S. at 21.
241. See supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text.
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g. Bureaucratic Reform
It is difficult to regulate the aviation industry given that it requires
an interface of local and federal authorities with private industry.
Each airport is unique in management, funding, and ownership. Many
airports are run by municipalities and most are both enmeshed in
political controversy and caught between competitive administrative
systems. The proposal for a new Chicagoland airport in Peotone, Illi-
nois caused friction between state officials who favored the proposal,
and local and federal officials (and the airlines) who opposed it.242
To implement any effective proposals for improved security, what
the nation needs is a new, professional, and independent body insu-
lated from political pressure and existing bureaucratic interests at all
levels. Both the FAA and DOT have been in existence so long that
they are the victims of entrenched interest groups both in the industry
and within their own administration. Most local agencies also face the
same issues. Society cannot afford to sustain the existing bureaucratic
status quo. An examination of the distribution of funds under Gore
Commission recommendations suggests that existing agencies with
strong political clout, especially the Pentagon and the FBI, used the
public panic about terrorism to justify massive increases in their budg-
ets. 243 By dismantling the existing administrative structures, we can
free talented professionals in the field to utilize their skills, just as
FAA and National Aeronautics and Space Administration did in the
early days of their existence. Creation of this new body would allow
representatives from all areas of aviation to assess and recommend
guidelines and procedures for airports to follow. While there are or-
ganizations, such as Airports Council International and American As-
sociation Airport Executives, membership is voluntary. 244 These
organizations are special interest groups. Membership dues from the
airport owners and operators fund these organizations. 245 Therefore,
the main interest represented is for themselves, not those of the
public.
242. See Dennis Byrne, Area's future still up in air, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at 33.
243. See supra notes 65-103 and accompanying text (discussing the Gore Commission).
244. For membership information about these organizations, see Airports Council Interna-
tional-North America, Membership and Benefits (visited Feb. 7, 2000)
<http://www.aci-na.org/new-website/membership/airport-membership/html>; American Associ-
ation of Airport Executives, About AAAE (visited Feb. 7, 2000)
<http://www.airportnet.org/depts/membership/info.htm>.




Another obstacle in discovering potential safety hazards at airports
is the threat of punitive measures being taken against the officials or
the airport when reported. In order to encourage employees, employ-
ers, and officials to report security recommendations or complaints,
immunity should be granted to both those people reporting and to
those against whom the complaint is directed. A review board could
initially assess the situation and direct officials to make the necessary
changes without taking punitive measures. Currently, this type of pro-
gram is offered to pilots, encouraging them to report unsafe equip-
ment on airplanes and to encourage pilots to do preliminary
investigations prior to boarding the aircraft.246
i. Increased Control of Access to Airfields
Access to airfields must be controlled at all levels. Stricter stan-
dards are needed to toughen the regulations on access to all areas
airside and landside of the airport. At O'Hare, a revolutionary pro-
gram is being implemented in the cargo area.247 The first system of its
kind to be introduced into American airports, drivers bringing cargo
to the airport will have to undergo a special fingerprint analysis to
gain entrance. 248 When the thumb is placed in a holder, information
about that person will appear at a command center.249 This is a very
high safety precaution, with only minor intrusion to the person, and
places a security emphasis on employees rather than passengers. In
addition to personal information (name, employer, etc.), a freight or-
der would also appear so that in the event of an airline accident, the
airport officials could verify all deliveries of cargo, as well as, the
name of the driver and supplier. 250
All employees in the airport should have to undergo this process for
gaining access to restricted areas. Currently, O'Hare uses a badging
system, that, while effective, does not ensure whether the badge has
been stolen and the individual's PIN number memorized. The finger-
print detector measures not only the fingerprint but also measures the
width of the finger and the temperature, making it nearly impossible
for a terrorist to gain entry with a detached finger. While not without
246. See Chicago O'Hare International Airport Noise Office, Fly Quiet Program (June 17,
1997) (on file with author).
247. Videotape: Universal Air Cargo Security Access System (SecurCom, Inc. 1999) (on file





APPROACHES TO AIRLINE SAFETY
high costs, this type of employee information would limit the access of
individuals to restricted areas and keep detailed computer records of
people on the airfield at all times.
j. Passenger Security Charge ("PSC")
Under current law, each airline passenger pays a three-dollar Pas-
senger Facility Charge ("PFC") for the use of the airport facilities25 l
and the costs associated with airport maintenance and develop-
ment.252 This surcharge is collected by the airlines at the time the
ticket is sold.253 Some industry professionals contend that the PFC
current use should be expanded to include a portion for safety. 254
Airline security measures, both those proposed by the Gore Commis-
sion and in this Comment, are expensive, but this cost could be man-
ageably funded through a program similar to the PFC.2 55 An
analogous surcharge placed on a ticket for security improvements
could also be collected by the airlines.2 56 The surcharge would be paid
by the very people whose safety it helps secure and should be man-
dated for use for research and technology needed for airport security.
III. CONCLUSION
[Niew technology becomes available with increasing speed. How-
ever, as technology is not the only answer, human effort must be
afforded the proper focus. Therefore, the bottom line is that until
some of the new technology is available and in place, tightened se-
curity must continue with a watchful eye toward protection of the
right to travel. 257
251. See 14 C.F.R. § 158 (1998).
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. FAA Reauthorization Bill, S. 82, 106th Cong. § 201 (1999). Currently, there are talks in
Congress to raise the PFC charge from $3 to $5, however, the intended use for the increase is for
airline competition and not security. PFCs are authorized for use for safety improvements, but
not so mandated. This author contends that the increase of $2 should be used only for safety and
security enhancements.
255. Chicago O'Hare International Airport has currently committed $20 million of its PFC
funds for enhanced security. See Robert C. Herguth, O'Hare to boost security against terrorists,
thieves, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Nov. 1, 1998, § 1, at 10.
256. Such a move would require federal authorization. "[Sluch charges were prohibited in the
early 1970s . . . [and since they were restored in 1990] . . . have been subject to federal restric-
tion." ACI HIGHLIGHTS (Airports Council International-North America, Washington, D.C.),
Vol. 36, Jan. 1999, at 3. At $2, a PSC would raise almost 900 million dollars annually, almost
90% of the total Gore Commission recommended expenditures. See President's Proposal, supra
note 72 (tabulating the Gore Commission total of $1.097 billion). PFCs currently generate more
than $1.3 billion dollars a year (at $3). See id.
257. Reser, supra note 34, at 823.
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Current political sentiment-fear of terrorism-has been used to
justify massive budget expansions of the Pentagon, the FBI, and other
agencies, and to justify actions which challenge constitutional rights to
travel, privacy, and equal protection. Something surely should be
done, but big-budget big-brother responses based on ignorance are no
substitute for considered action. Profiling has already been tried, and
has been shown to be ineffective. Profiling, and the personal data-
gathering and management that it calls for, is the worst aspect of the
new proposed security measures, the least likely to be effective, and
the most likely to threaten the liberties upon which our nation is
founded.
If drastic action is called for to address security concerns, the action
should be taken to reorganize the bloated and ineffective bureaucracy.
Such creative solutions would inevitably provoke intense resistance
within the existing system. Only strong pressure could overcome such
resistance. It is in the nation's interest to harness our increasing con-
cern for airline safety to break down bureaucratic obstacles to safety,
not to justify massive uninformed expenditures and limits on personal
freedom as the Gore Commission did.
Jamie L. Rhee
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